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THE THEORETICAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE NEW
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
HIGH MIDDLE AGES: "REI
PUBLICAE INTEREST, NE
CRIMINA REMANEANT
IMPUNITA"
RichardM Fraher*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the latter part of the twelfth century, criminal law suddenly caused a sharp conflict between church and crown in England.
Thomas Becket's intransigence concerning criminal jurisdiction over
the English clergy gave rise to a bitter and protracted confrontation
between the archbishop and King Henry II. The clash culminated in
Archbishop Becket's dramatic martyrdom at Canterbury Cathedral.'
In 1203, some thirty years after the Becket controversy had violently
ended, the Bishop of London, William of Ste. Mere-Eglise, wrote to
Pope Innocent III. William inquired, in a somewhat more levelheaded way than Becket, about two of the points for which the prickly
archbishop had sacrificed his life. First, William asked for Innocent's
advice concerning whether prelates might forcibly incarcerate clerics
who had proved incorrigible by repeated offenses and by escaping from
penitential detention in monasteries. Second, William asked whether
laymen might escape the penalty of ipso facto excommunication if they
laid violent hands upon clerics whose rebellion left them no alternative
but to use force in capturing and arraigning the miscreants.2
* FormerlyAssistant Professorof History,HarvardUniversity B.A. 1971, Wright State University, M.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Ph.D. 1978, Cornell University; LiberalArts
Fellow, HarvardLaw School 1983-84. Presently a JD. candidate at HarvardLaw School
.The author wishes to thank the Masterand Fellows of St. John's College, Cambridge,England,
for the Overseas Visiting Scholarship which provided supportfor this research.
1. For general accounts of the Becket controversy, see the relevant chapters in D.
KNOWLES, THOMAS BECKET (1970), and W.L. WARREN, HENRY 11 (1973). A more extensive bibliography is available in Alexander, 19 J. BRIT. STUD. 1-26 (1970).
2. X 5.39.35:
Sane consuluisti nos utrum clerici graviter excedentes qui tute non possunt monasteriis ad
agendam penitentiam deputari, quoniam, cum non peniteant de commissis, opportunitate
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Pope Innocent III's reply to William's inquiry is preserved in the
decretal Utfame.3 Innocent's response reflects both the cooling of tempers between 1170 and 1203, and his ability to draw upon Roman legal
antecedents to frame the specific content of the reply as a broad juristic
principle. The pope wrote that prelates could and ought to imprison
incorrigibly wayward clerics.4 The pope also wrote that laymen could
use violence to arrest clerics accused of serious crimes if the laymen
acted upon a mandate from the clerics' superiors, and if the laymen
used only such violence as they needed to overcome the wayward clerics' "defense or rebellion." 5
The tone of William's inquiry and the gist of Innocent's response
indicate that neither William nor Innocent was primarily concerned
with questions of ecclesiastical rights and liberties. Rather, they both
addressed the concern which ostensibly had driven Henry II to confront his bishops at Winchester in 1163: the uncontrolled increase in
crime, specifically among the clergy who enjoyed immunity from secular prosecution. 6 The king had phrased his complaint about contemporary lawlessness in terms of a mythic past, when his predecessor had
enforced good laws. Innocent reached still further into the past and
phrased his remarks, not in the context of contemporary conditions, but
in the context of three principles which Innocent presented as timeless
truths: the prelates are responsible for correcting the excesses of their
subjects, the wicked respond to impunity by becoming yet more
wicked, and as a matter of public utility crimes should not remain
unpunished.7
This article explores the origin, development, and eventual expansion of Innocent III's pronouncement that "publicae utilitatis intersit,
ne crimina remaneant impunita." Although Innocent apparently borrowed the phrase from an anonymous contemporary, medieval scholars thoroughly searched for its Roman law origins. This approach to
criminal law produced a startling change in legal and public attitudes
fugiendi captata carcerem fugerent claustri, et prioribus se sceleribus scelestius immiscerent, a
te vel ahis prelatis suis arctae possint custodiae mancipari, et utrum laici, se clericos in magnis
sceleribus deprehendant, in canonem incidant latae sententiae, cum nec comprehendere nec
ad iudices trahere ipsos possint, nisi manus in eos iniecerint violentas.
3. Utfame is the incipit of the decretal, which is printed in 2 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI 904
(E. Friedberg ed., repr. 1959). Hereafter, all citations to Roman and canon law sources will follow
the conventional forms established by the Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law.
4. Id [Prelati] non solum possunt, sed debent etiam superiores clericos, postquam fuerint
de crimine canonice condemnati, sub arcta custodia detinere.
5. X 5.39.35 in medio: "Laici vero citra excommunicationis sententiam capere clericos et
ad iudicium trahere possunt, si oporteat, etiam violenter, dum tamen id de mandato faciant prelatorum . . .dum tamen non amplius eorum violentia se extendat quam defensio vel rebellio
potius exigit clericorum."
6.

See 4 SUMMA CAUSAE INTER REGEM ET THOMAM:

MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY OF

ARCHBISHOP THOMAS BECKET 202 (Rolls ser.) (J.C. Robertson ed., London 1879).
7. X 5.39.35 in medio: "[Prelatil excessus corrigere debeant subditorum, et publicae
utilitatis intersit, ne crimina remaneant impunita, et per impunitatis audaciam fiant qui nequam
fuerant nequiores."
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toward state prosecution of criminals and the safeguards protecting
their rights. The ramifications of this change in focus can be seen in the
divisive modem attitudes toward criminal procedure.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF "REI PUBLICAE INTEREST, NE CRIMINA
REMANEANT IMPUNITA"

Innocent's statements may seem at first glance to contain truths so
self-evident that one need not pause to glance twice. The entire thrust
of the Latin patristic tradition underlay the magisterial conception of
prelates, whose functions were predicated, at least in part, on the model
of Roman magistrates charged with "correcting the excesses" of their
subjects. There was nothing new, either, in the idea that the failure to
punish deviancy leads to moral and behavioral deterioration. The
Roman law and the Latin fathers strongly believed in the deterrent
function of punishment. Finally, there is nothing immediately striking
in Innocent's parenthetical observation "publicae utilitatis intersit, ne
crimina remaneant impunita"-"In the interest of public utility, crimes
ought not to remain unpunished."'
Enforcement of the law stands with diplomacy, defense, and taxation as one of the functions which modem observers associate with the
state. According to the popular version of western history, those functions were defined and exercised in classical antiquity, subverted by
centuries of barbarian ignorance and feudal disarray, and finally resurrected following the rediscovery of Roman law. This rediscovery led,
however gradually, to the establishment of the modem western state.
In Innocent's decretal, most legal historians would find a nice, but not
atypical, example of the rebirth of Roman law in its best medieval
garb. A rebirth, that is, in the form of a legal maxim that civilian lawyers and canonists in the age of scholasticism abstracted from its context in the Corpus luris civilis and applied willy-nilly.
The reasonable medievalist would expect that the phrase "publicae utilitatis intersit, ne crimina remaneant impunita" is an example of
a phenomenon illustrated by Gaines Post's study9 of the legal maxim
"What touches all should be approved by all" (Quod omnes tangit ad
Post found that this legal rule had originated
omnibus approbetur).
as a parenthetical remark embedded in a lex in the Digest. Canon lawyers then excerpted the remark during the High Middle Ages to explain
such diverse topics as the right of cathedral canons to counsel and consent in matters concerning the alienation of episcopal property, "the
right of even lay people to be represented in decision-making processes
concerning the faith," and the ultimate authority of general councils of
8.
9.

Id
Post, .4 Romano-CanonicalMaxim "Quod omnes tangt" in Bracton, 4 TRADITIO 197-251

(1946).
10. The full phrase is: "Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus debeat communiter approbari."
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the Church in matters of doctrine." Peter Stein further elaborated12the
standard model for the emergence of Romano-canonical maxims.
If Innocent's phrase, for example, followed Stein's standard
model, Innocent would have excised the phrase from its original
Roman law context shorn of any limitations that the original setting
imposed. He would have then reformulated the phrase as a general
principle and fruitfully applied it to all sorts of situations disassociated
from the original meaning of the phrase. "Quod omnes tangit" remains
the best known example of this process, having moved from a specific
context in private law to the theory of representation in religious communities, thence to the theory of conciliarism, and finally, once the
kings of England had begun to call parliaments, to the level of national
constitutional theory, ripe with revolutionary potential.
In the centuries succeeding Innocent's time, Innocent's phrase,
slightly abbreviated, enjoyed at least as stellar a career as "Quod omnes
tangit." The scholastic jurists seized upon Innocent's decretal as the
raison d'etre for virtually every innovation in criminal law from the
thirteenth through the sixteenth century. As early as 1210, the decretalist Tancred used Innocent's phrasing in much the same way as a medieval preacher employed a passage from scripture to begin a sermon.
Tancred's Summula de criminibus begins: "Quoniam rei publice interest, ut crimina non remaneant impunita. . .. "I'
Within a generation of canonists after Tancred, the maxim became
a standard catch-phrase. Johannes Teutonicus, commenting on the
early thirteenth-century canonical collection known as Compilatio
tertia,did not explain this section of Innocent's decretal other than to
list three passages from Roman law that Teutonicus thought expressed
the same concept.' 4 By mid-century, however, Hostiensis, perhaps the
most influential thirteenth-century canonist, discovered widespread
uses for Innocent's phrase. Commenting upon this passage of
Innocent's decretal, Hostiensis wrote: "Here you have a notable snippet
which we use frequently, saying that it is in the interest of the republic
or of public utility that crimes not remain unpunished."' 5 The obligatory citations from Roman law follow, along with the conventional observation that impunity leads to delinquency, while inflicting penal
11.

See supra note 9.

12.

P. STEIN, REGULAE IURIS passim (1966).

13. See Fraher, Tancred's Summula de criminibus: A New Text and a Key to the Ordo
iudiciarius,9 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 23-36 (1979).
14.

J. TEUTONICUS,

APPARATUS

GLOSSARUM IN COMPILATIONEM TERTIAM

ad 3 Comp.

5.21.8 s.v. ne crimina. C. de penis Si operis (CODE JUST. 9.47.14), ff. de fideius. Si a reo § Id quod
(DIG. JUST. 46.1.70.5), ff. de iudic. Si longius (DIG. JUST. 5.1.18). K. Pennington's edition of the
Apparatus appears in 3 MONUMENTA IURIS CANONICI (ser. A) (1980) (Corpus Glossatorum).
15.

HOSTIENs1s, LECTURA IN V GREGORII NONI DECRETALIUM LIBROS ad X 5.39.35 (Paris

1512) s.v. etpublice. "Hic habes notabile scissum quo frequenter utimur, dicentes rei vel utilitatis
publice interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita."
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sanctions creates terror and restrains others from sinning. 6 True to his
word, Hostiensis used Innocent's "snippet" in a number of contexts
touching upon criminal law. Hostiensis always used the passage to justify some curb upon the traditional protections of the defendant and
the learned law's guarantee of full, formal procedures in criminal cases,
safeguards which often frustrated zealous officials' puirsuit of
malefactors.
For example, the legal development which most directly
threatened to subvert the defendant's traditional guarantee of "due
process" (ordo iudicii) was the old idea that a judge could pronounce a
definitive sentence in a "notorious" crime without citing the accused or
establishing proof beyond the fact of notoriety.' 7 Hostiensis, who did
not agree with the more extreme applications of this approach, wrote
that "it is better and safer to summon the accused (and thus to allow for
his defense), unless perhaps the delay would cause scandal or grave
danger to the republic."1 8 Hostiensis concluded his discussion of notoriety by saying that "this is special in criminal matters, ne crimina
remaneant impunita."'

III.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

4. Development of the Public Interest
The idea that the community had a legitimate interest in criminal
prosecution caused thoroughgoing changes in almost every aspect of
the criminal process. The shift that students of history most widely
appreciate is the move away from an accusatorial process to an inquisition (inquisitio). The jurists repeatedly expressed a clear self-consciousness about this fundamental alteration in the criminal law, repeatedly
justifying the change by recourse to the phrase "publice interest, ne
crimina remaneant impunita."2 ° Hostiensis suggested this movement
16. Id ad X 5.39.35 s.v. per impunitati. "Alias et per impunitatis. Nam facilitas venie incentivum tribuit delinquenti ... et pena terrorem incutit, et retrahit alios a peccatis."
17. A crime which was notorium or nanifestum did not require the full ordo iudiciarius,according to many of the canons collected in Gratian's Decretum at C.2 q. 1. See K.W. NoERR, ZUR
STELLUNG DES RICHTERS IM GELEHRTEN PROZESS DER FRUEHZEIT 43-44 (1969); Levy, La hiirarchie despreuves dans le drot savant du moyen age 32-66 (1939).
18. HOSTIENSIS, supra note 15, ad X 3.2.8 s.v. notoriur.
Vel dicas quod generaliter in quolibet notorio potest procedi sine citatione et probationibus.
Nec propter hoc retractabitur sententia nisi
constat contrarium. . . . Sed melius est et tutius
ut citatio fiat antequam procedetur, nisi forte scandalum uel magnum periculum reipublice sit
in mora. Et secundum hos qui hoc asserunt, quandocumque aliquid negatur notorium
semper probandum est. Sed hoc nihil aliud est quam prolongare lites et circuitus inducere.
Unde dicendum est quod ubi non est locus inficiatoni potest iudex procedere et delinquentem
punire quantumcumque inficietur.
19. Id "Et hoc est speciale in maleficiis, ne remaneant impunita."
20.

See, e.g., BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA IN IUS UNIVERSUM CIVILE (Basel 1562) [hereinafter

cited as BARTOLUS, CIVILE] ad DIG. JUST. 48.5.2.5: "[I]sta inquisitio succedat in locum accusationis, ut iudex vices accusatoris sustineat." BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA AD I-XII LIBROS CODICIS
(Basel 1562) [hereinafter cited as BARTOLUS, CODICIS] ad CODE JUST. 1.1.1 s.v. cunctos no. 47:
[C]um de iure communi inquisitio fiat ad vindictam pulicam ... et ad delictum puniendum
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to an inquisition by including among the functions of judges the obligation to obviate the malices of men and to punish crimes. Hostiensis
cited Innocent's decretal Utfame as the textual authority for this responsibility.2 ' More specifically, Hostiensis explicitly rejected the conventional opinion of the canonists and the civilian jurists who taught
that courts could not coerce witnesses to testify in criminal cases. The
function of the witness, Hostiensis countered, is a public office.2 2 If
jurists construed criminal accusations as merely private matters, and if
courts could not compel witnesses to testify on behalf of an accuser,
"the innocent would be damned and the guilty would be absolved,"2 3
because in an accusatorial procedure the plaintiff bound himself to the
lex talionis.2 a And so, concluded Hostiensis, crimes would remain
unpunished.
This same process of turning "private" functions into "public"
functions appeared in Hostiensis's treatment of procedure by denunciation. Roman law and Christian tradition taught that only interested
parties might proceed via denunciation. Innocent's dictum obviously
applied in cases where the right to initiate an action derived from interesse, and Hostiensis did not fail to make the connection. Although an
individual might not have a specific interest in prosecuting a given
crime, Hostiensis alleged that everyone has a general interest in every
crime. This interest, the "ratio rei publice," might translate best as "by
reason of state."2 5 Hostiensis's discussion ended by reiterating
non occultandum . . . . Nam reipublice interest habere bonos subiectos . . . set homines
boni efficiuntur si eis pena imponatur ex delicto. . . et de hoe quod expresse sit ratio publice
discipline. . . . Interest ergo sua punire subditos, et sic statutum ad cos extenderetur ....
Inquisitio enim succedit loco accusationis.
See also F. DE ZABARELLIS, LEcruRA SUPER I-V LIBRiS DECRETALIUM ad X 5.1.24 (Venice 1502)
s.v. Hunc tamen (quoting Cynus: "[Q]uia processus inquisitorius est adinventus ut crimina non
remaneant impunita."); A. ARETINUS, TRACTATUS DE MALEFICIIS (Venice 1578) rubr. Hec est
quedam inquisitio, no. 29: "[A]ccusatio de quolibet crimine est permissa, ergo et inquisitio que
succedit loco cius. . . . Et sic ad eundem effectum, ne maleficia remaneant impunita."
21. HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA AUREA (Venice 1605) tit. De officio iudicis, rubr. Quid sit officium
iudicis?, col. 342: "Proprio enim motu debet cuncta rimari ... certain sententiam dare. . . lites
dirimere. . . partes ad compositionem inducere. . . malitiis hominum obviare ... exceptiones
arctare. . . crimina punire . ... "
22. Id De testibus cogendis, col. 637: "Agimus supra de testibus, quorum officium publicum est." Traditionally, Hostiensis wrote, witnesses were not compelled to testify in criminal
cases:
ubi contra salutem hominis oppressa putatur esse iustitia . . . . Licet consuetudo in foro
ecclesi hanc opinionem amplexa fuerit usque ad hec tempora et communis sit opinio magistrorum, dico tamen earn erroneam. Nam secundum earn damnabitur innocens, qui primus
afficiendus esset, et nocens absolvetur, qui condemnandus erat, contra . . . . Et sic delicta
remanebunt impunita, quia cum accusans sciat quod non cogetur testis, non accusabit, timens
penam talionis.
23. Id
24. The lex lalionis was the principle in Roman and canon law whereby accusers who failed
to prove their cases became liable to the same punishments which the defendants would have
received if convicted.
25. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 21, De denunciatoribus, col. 1469:
Item potest denunciari peccatum ab eo cuius interest . . . quoad specialem utilitatem. Vel
licet specialiter non intersit, interest tamen generaliter et etiam temporaliter. Puta prelatus
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Innocent's maxim in an interesting new permutation: "It is in everyone's interest that crimes should not remain unpunished."26 The same
justification permitted ecclesiastical or secular judges to conduct inquisitionesinto the behavior of their subjects, without any private accusation or denunciation. In ex officio inquisitions, according to
Hostiensis, judges could proceed without observing the solemnities of
the law (deplano). The judges could punish malefactors through fines
and sometimes torture, excommunication, or suspension from office.
The judges did whatever seemed expeditious, for the law committed
the decision concerning proper punishment to the arbitrium, or discretionary power, of the judge.27
Hostiensis applied Innocent's little phrase with a fair measure of
creative ingenuity, and Hostiensis's influence did much to popularize
the refrain "ne crimina remaneant impunita." Hostiensis does not,
however, reflect the entire story. His contemporary, Sinibaldus Fieschi,
who became Pope Innocent IV, proceeded more scrupulously in expanding the sphere of public interest in criminal prosecutions at the
expense of private interests. Innocent IV, accordingly, recognized that
something special about criminal cases permitted a judge to proceed
summarily in a case of notorious crime, because "interest rei publice,
ne crimina remaneant impunita. ' '2 8 But Innocent qualified this asser-

tion very carefully, requiring the inquiring judge to establish both that
the accused had actually committed the crime and that the qualitas
facti,the quality of the deed, was indeed notorious. 29 Innocent IV, unlike Hostiensis, resisted the impulse to sweep aside the traditional view
that criminal prosecution was a matter of private interest. In contrast
to Hostiensis, Innocent taught that the court could not force witnesses
to testify; moreover, refusal to bring to light another's crime was meritorious.3 0 Only in severely circumscribed cases, where silence would
sustain an infamous sinner in some dignity and hence lead to scandal,
est, cuius interest habere bonum subditum, vel subditus cuius interest habere bonum prelatum. Vel interest ratione reipublice, nam et tunc quilibet admittitur, ut puta si bona ecclesiastica delapidantur.
26. Id "Interest autem cuiuslibet, ne crimina remaneant impunita."
27. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 21, De criminibus sine ordine puniendis, col. 1481:
Secundum leges et canones ad quemlibet iudicem pertinet excessus subditorum laicorum et
aliquoties clericorum etiam sine aliqua fama inquirere et punire. Hoc enim publice interest
. Et proceditur in his de piano, sine aliqua solemnitate, ita quod iudex malos expellat et
bonos admittat, alias in pecunia puniendo, aliquando in corpore torquendo, vel excommunicando vel suspendendo, prout viderit expedite, quia hec omnia arbitrio suo committuntur.
28. INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA IN V LIBROS DECRETALIUM ad X 3.2.7 (Venice 1610) s.v.
notoriunr "Sed dicimus quod speciale est in maleficiis, quia interest reipublice, ne crimina
remaneant impunita."
29. Id "[Elt tamen necessarium est quod non solum probet maleficium, sed etiam qualitatem facti, scilicet quod homicida insultum fuerit et occiderit, et sic de omnibus aliis, quia alias
est inficiatoni locus."
30. Id ad X 2.21.1 s.v. odio. "In criminalibus autem et ubi non est peccatum celare veritatem, non presumo eum qui non vult reddere testimonium taliter (scil. ex odio) se subtrahere,
quod idcirco non est cogendus nisi manifeste apparet malitia . . . " And infra s.v. compella.
"Ubi autem celare veritatem non est peccatum, ut quando agitur criminaliter. . . vel alio modo
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or where occult crimes such as heresy or the dilapidation of churches
would lead to further damage, did Innocent IV approve of forcing witnesses to testify. 31 Innocent's sparing use of the idea that Hostiensis
widely applied is an extremely important piece of evidence, because it
suggests that not all thirteenth-century jurists immediately accepted the
idea of public interest in every criminal prosecution as a universal and
self-evident truth. Innocent IV countered his namesake's new maxim
and Hostiensis's arguments with a fully articulated alternative view.
But before returning to the grounds for Innocent IV's resistance to the
idea of public interest in crime and punishment, we should look ahead
to see whose position won wider acceptance among the jurists of subsequent generations.
B.

Spread of Hostiensis's View

Without doubt, Hostiensis's position won wider acceptance. The
proceduralist William Durantis, who became the great purveyor of
Innocent III's maxim, shared Hostiensis's view.3 2 Durantis's Speculum
iudiciale,first published around 1272 and later glossed by the canonist
Johannes Andreae 33 and by the great civilian Baldus de Ubaldis, 34 remained the most popular textbook on procedure until the end of the
Middle Ages. Following the example of Tancred s3 Durantis placed his
entire discussion of criminal procedure under the rubric of Innocent
III's dictum. The third book of the Speculum iudiciale begins:
Above, in the preceding section we have explicated at length how
one ought to proceed in civil cases. But because criminal adjudications occur frequently, and because it is useful to the state that
crimes should not remain unpunished . . . according to which
"you shall not suffer malefactors to live", therefore we have foreseen that it will be useful to dispute a few things concerning the
new teaching [nova doctrina] of this matter.3 6
The lawyers after Durantis used the idea of public interest to chip
away at defendants' rights and procedural guarantees that had been
ad penam tantum, non dicimus cogendos, quia celare vertitatem non est peccatum sed meritorium, scilicet celare crimen fratris."
31. Id "[N]isi esset crimen de quo esset periculum quod esset occultum, sicut heresis, delapidatio. Nam in his dicimus testes cogendos etiam si sit occulturn, quia nequeunt sine periculo
dissimulari."

32. For Durantis's career, see F.C. VON SAVIGNY, 5 GESCHICHTE DES ROEMISCHEN RECHTS
im MIT-IrELALTER 345 (2d ed. photog. repr. 1961).
33. See SAVIGNY, 6 GESCHICHTE DES ROEMISCHEN RECHTS 98.
34. Id at 208.
35. For Tancred's career, see J.A. CLARENCE-SMITH, MEDIEVAL LAW TEACHERS AND WRITERS, CIVILIAN AND CANONIST 38, 54 (1975).
36. G. DURANTIS, SPECULUM IUDICIALE (Lugduni 1521) pars tertia, fol. 1: "Superius in
parte precedenti plenius explicavimus qualiter in civilibus sit negotiis procedendum. Sed
quoniam criminalia iudicia sepe frequentantur, et quia reipublice utile est, ne maleficia remaneant
impunita. . . iuxta imud maleficos non patieris vivere, ideo fore previdimus de ipsius nova doc-

trina aliqua disputare."
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fixtures of the Romano-canonical tradition. The twelfth century had
perhaps witnessed a brief moment when criminal defendants enjoyed
virtual impunity in courts which rigidly adhered to the procedural rules
of the learned law. In England, at least, the ease with which clerical
offenders escaped retribution created a public scandal. 3 7 The Romanocanonical criminal procedure struck most contemporaries as inadequate, and the learned lawyers of the thirteenth century responded by
tightening the screws-literally and figuratively-in the name of the
public interest.
Generalizing the patterns of change, historians have simply stated
that the odds shifted after 1200, weighing increasingly heavily against
the accused.3" The simple reason for this shift is that crime was becoming a public rather than a private concern. According to Albertus
Gandinus (approximately 1290), a judge could force accusers to bring
charges against suspected criminals because "it is expeditious for the
state, that crimes not remain unpunished.1 39 Gandinus also noted that
according to the canon law, fama, or ill-fame, constituted sufficient
grounds for a judge to begin an inquisition against a suspect.40 In secular courts, however, the mere commission of a crime permitted a judge
to conduct an inquisition ex offlcio. 41 Gandinus's ideas concerning the
function of inquisitio led to Bonifacius de Vitalinis's teaching that
inquisitio was a judicial function aimed at detecting and punishing
crimes, and that the law had invented inquisitorial courts favore rei
publice, "in favor of the state."4 2 By the fifteenth century, inquisitiohad
37. The most serious case was the murder of William FitzHerbert by Osbert of York. See
THE LETTERS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 16 (W.J. Millor, H.E. Butler & C.N.L. Brooke eds. 1955).
See also THE LETTERS AND CHARTERS OF GILBERT FOLIOT 127 (A. Morey & C.N.L. Brooke eds.
1967).
38. See, e.g., Pazzaglini, The CriminalBan of the Sienese Commune, 45 STUDI SENESI 106
(1979): "The weight of evidence in the inquisitorial proceeding put the burden of proof on the
accused, whose rights were but vaguely formulated. At least in a judicial duel, a man had a
chance, even if guilty. Now the odds were against him .
"
39. Gandinus, Traciatus de malecis, in TRACTATUS DIVERSI SUPER MALEFICIIS (Lugduni
1555), rubr. Quid sit accusatio et quando accusator sit necessarius, c.4: "Sed pone quod Titius
interfecit hominem, heredes vel fratres eius mortui timebat accusationem deponere propter potentiam illius Titii. Modo queritur numquid potestas possit illos heredes et fratres compellere accusare. . . ? Et videtur quod possit, quia expedit reipublice ne maleficia remaneant impunita."
40. Id at rubr. Quomodo de maleficiis cognoscatur per inquisitionem:
Sed hodie de iure civili indices potestatum de quolibet maleficio cognoscunt ex officio suo per
inquisitionem, quod videtur posse fieri per hec iura [numerous citations, et ita servant iudices
per consuetudinem. . . . Et ita vidi communiter observari, quamvis sit contra ius civile. De
iure Lombardico potest iudex de quolibet et super quolibet maleficio procedere per inquisitionem.
lure enim canonico de quolibet maleficio et super quoliber maleficio inquiritur, si tamen
interveniant ea que sequuntur, et non alias regulariter. In primis est necessarium quod ille
contra quem inquiritur sit infamatus de illo crimine, idest quod sit publica vox et fama quod
ille sit culpabilis ....
41. Id
42. de Vitalinis, Tractatusde maleflciis, in TRACTATUS DIVERSI SUPER MALEFICIIS (Lugduni
1555), rubr. De inquisitionibus et earum forma: "Inquisitio est alicuius criminis indagatio ....
Vel inquisitio est iudicis officium ad inveniendum malorum delicta et pena debita punienda,
favore rei publice introductum. . . . Nam rei publice interest, ne commitentur maleficia."
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become commonplace, indisputedly displacing accusatio as the standard criminal procedure, the remedium ordinarium. This displacement,
according to Bartholomew Salicet and Angelus Aretinus, resulted from
efforts to extend
public prosecution of crimes-"ne maleficia remane' 4a

ant impunita.

A myriad of substantive changes accompanied the growth of the
inquisitorial mode of criminal procedure. In accusatorial proceedings,
accuser and accused faced one another in a delicate balance of jeopardies, with the judge presiding as referee, "declining neither to the left
nor to the right." The inquisitorial judge, according to Gandinus and
Bonifacius de Vitalinis, was the defender of his jurisdiction against
malefactors.4 5 Gandinus suggested that one of the judge's functions
was to strike terror into the hearts of would-be offenders by the savagery of the judicial process.'
The civilians, the canonists, and the
legislators of the city-states that employed the Romano-canonical law,
(ius commune) conspired to provide the defenders of the public order
with arms sufficient to overwhelm criminals and malefactors. The accuser in most criminal cases escaped the traditional lex talionis by opting for inquisition or denunciation instead of the hazardous
accusatorial procedure.47 Witnesses the law formerly excluded from
testifying found themselves rehabilitated-"ne crimina remaneant

impunita." 4

The concept of circumstantial evidence, based upon the idea of
fama and the pseudo-scientific measurement of indicia,led to short-cuts
43. Aretinus, Traciatus de malefic/is, in TRACTATUS DIVERSI SUPER MALEFICIIS (Lugduni
1555), rubr. Hec est quedan inquisitio, no. 74: "Hodie autem cum per statutum permittatur quod
de omni crimine possit fieri inquisitio, et sic inquisitio erit remedium ordinarium [citations from
Bartolus and Salicet]. . . . Nec est inquisitio remedium extraordinarium ... si teneas quod de
omni crimine potest inquiri ad publicarn vindictam." If an inquisition failed to prove a case
against a malefactor, the victim might yet proceed via accusation, "ne delictum remaneat impunitum." Angelus thought inquisitio more useful than accusatio: "Magis favorabilis est inquisitio ad reprimendum ipsa delicta, quam accusatio."
44. Medieval jurists routinely described the judge's office as being placed in medio, between
the two parties to a suit. Extensive citations in K.W. NOERR, supra note 17, at 17. Gandinus,
supra note 40, at rubr. Qualiter advocati circa accusationem se debent habere: "Debet esse iudex
medius inter utramque partem et personam, non declinando a dextris neque a sinistris, ut C. de
falsis 1. Ubi (CODE JUST. 9.22.22)."
45. Gandinus, supranote 39, at rubr. Quid sit agendum reo absente et contumace: "Quelibet
potestas et iudex potest iurisdictionem suam defendere penali iudicio." de Vitalinis, supra note 42,
at proemium, no. 10: "Nam malos punire et bonos sublevare et defendere eorum officium est."
46. Gandinus, supra note 39, at rubr. A quo vel a quibus possit fama incipere: "Et ideo
videtur quod index animadvertendo in eundem ut iniuriosum et male meritum possit ut terribilem
se ostendendo de dicto crimine inquirere per tormenta, et maxime, ut publice aliis ad terrenda
maleficia sit exemplum."
47. Aretinus, supra note 43, at rubr. Et ad querelam Titii infrascripti, no. 7: "Hodie communiter ex forma statutorum Italic hoc non observatur, ut accusator stet detentus, quia ut
plurimum ex forma statutorum, accusator non tenetur ad penam talionis."
48. INNOCENT IV, supra note 28, at ad X 2.20.10 s.v. et cum altero: "Videtur quod saltem in
exceptis criminibus infames et participes criminis admittendi sunt ad testimonium." The judge,
moreover, decided which witnesses' testimony to believe; see BARTOLUS, CIVILE, supranote 20, ad
DIG. JUST. 22.5.3.1: "Nota quod patestati iudicis conceditur utrum debeat adhiberi fides testi vel
non."
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in the law of proof.4 9 While Roman and canonical tradition demanded
testimony from two eyewitnesses or the accused's confession as the
minimum standard of proof in criminal cases, the ius commune followed the thirteenth-century canonists by creating a set of alternative
standards. To root out sexually incontinent clerics, heretics, and usurers, ecclesiastical reformers established classes of "notorious" and
"manifest" crimes which required less stringent proofs in court." The
use of partial proofs to justify torture, and moreover the burgeoning
jurisprudence concerning torture that aimed at securing confessions in
the absence of eyewitness testimony, both found justification under the
umbrella of public interest.5" During the thirteenth century, the conception of crime shifted away from the canonists' association between
crime and sin, and away from the civilians' traditional teaching that
only the handful of offenses that Roman law defined as actionable by
any citizen constituted crimina.5 2 By 1300, all maleficia, including delicts, came under public, inquisitorial cognizance, and the law began
defining crime as an offense against public interest. In practice, by the
end of the thirteenth century, inquisition ex offcio had displaced private initiative in criminal prosecution. 3
Penal practice became more harsh as jurists adapted the learned
law for everyday use in the criminal courts. Furthermore, the officers
of the courts moved away from conflict resolution into prosecuting and
49. See J.P. LEVY, LA HIERARCHIE DES PREUVES DANS LE DROIT SAVANT DU MOYEN AGE
127-30 (1939); Levy, Le problme de la preuve dans les droits savants du moyen age, in 17 LA
PREUVE, RECEUILS DE LA SOCIfT JEAN BODIN 137-67 (1965). The history of the jurists' treatment offama, and especially the influence of Thomas de Piperata's Tractatus defama, is a subject
which I plan to treat at greater length elsewhere.
50. The canonists created a theory of notorium based on two decretals concerning clerical
cohabitation, X 3.2.7 and X 3.2.8. These passages in the Corpus luris canonici became the locus for
the decretalists' analysis offama, notorium, and man!festum. Bartolus acknowledged that crimen
notorium was a creation of the canonists; see BARTOLUS, CIVILE, supra note 20, ad DIG. JUST.
48.16.6.3, no. 3: "Tractatum de notoriis criminibus non habemus in iure nostro, sed canonistae
habent tractatum longum."
51. See Damaska, The Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L.J. 866 (1978). The author notes
the ubiquity of the refrain "ne crimina remaneant impunita" in medieval discussions of torture.
The implication of public interest would have been clear to any scholastically trained lawyer.
52. For the canonistic definition, see the Decretum D.25 dict. Gratiani post c.3: "Crimen est
querela, idest peccatum accusatione et dampnatione dignum." For the civilian definition, see
BARTOLUS, CIVILE, supra note 20, ad DIG. JUST. 47.1.3: "Aut quis agit ad penam applicandum
sibi, et est iudicium civile, aut agit ad penam applicandum fisci vel inferendum parti in corpus, et
tunc est iudicium criminale." See also the glossa ordinaria to DIG. JUST. 47.1, ad titulum De
privatis delictis: "Et recte in titulo delictis, non criminibus. Nam delicta proprie sunt privata,
crimina publica."
53. The standard questio through which the jurists elaborated this point was the case in
which a judge wished to inquire ex officio in a criminal case, in which an accusator wished to
proceed via private accusation. Gandinus, supra note 40, at rubr. Quomodo de maleficiis cognoscatur per inquisitionem, no. 17, offers several reasons for preferring inquisitio: "Quoniam per
inquisitionem non requirantur multe solenitates, et sic facilius poterit culpa inveniri. . . . Item,
cum duo accusant, idoneior eligitur; sic hic publica persona preferenda est private . . . . Item
reipublice interest et etiam iudicis, invenire hoc crimen et prevenire ....
" This questio remained
a fixture in the jurists' discussion of criminal procedure, from the time of Guido de Suzaria to that
of the Bartolists.
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punishing criminal offenses as a matter of public interest. The jurists,
to their credit, never totally lost sight of the rehabilitative ends expressed in the penitential theory of the Latin fathers.54 But despite this
limited survival and despite the availability of a theory of social utility
as the basis for a penal law aimed at rehabilitation and deterrence, 55 a
vindictive conception of the ends of criminal justice dominated penal
law in the later Middle Ages. Inquisitors and magistrates alike opted
for brutal adaptations of the harshest features of the Romano-canonical tradition, the Old Testament, and the Lombard Laws. Jurists portrayed beating, blinding, branding, slashing nostrils, and hanging for
petty theft as exercises of vindicta in defense of public interest. They
rationalized the penal law, like other developments, in terms of Innocent III's maxim.56 Jurists used public interest to justify the Italian
communes' use of the criminal ban to condemn suspects who failed to
answer criminal summonses, much as the ecclesiastical inquisition used
excommunication against contumacious defendants.5 7 In both cases,
the criminal law severely curtailed the defendant's right of appeal.5"
Popular pressure upon communal governments, urging the magistrates
to curb criminal behavior at whatever cost, influenced the evolution of
criminal justice. Despite the expense and effort, a commune such as
Siena experimented repeatedly with multiple overlapping criminal jurisdictions, each having an independent police force.5 9 Indeed, the
public functions of police forces seemingly found their initial definition
by the fourteenth century, for at that time the testimony of police officials began to carry decisive weight in Italian courts.6"
54. See W. ULLMANN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF LAW AS REPRESENTED BY LUCAS DE PENNA
142-62 (1946).
55. See, e.g., DURANDUS OF ST. POURCAIN, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS fols. 10-23 (Paris 1506);
Tierney, Public Expediency and Natural Law- .4 Fourteenth-Century Discussion on the Origins of
Government and Property, in AUTHORITY AND POWER: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN ON His SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 167-82 (1980).
56. de Vitalinis, supra note 42, catalogues a variety of penalties under the rubric De penis
condemnationis. Lombard influence is evident in the gloss to DIG. JUST. 48.18.1 s.v. confessus, and
in J. DE BELLOVISU, TRACTATUS IUDICIORUM CRIMINALIUM rubr. De furtis et latronibus, invoking
the Lombard penalties for theft: for the first offense, loss of an eye; for the second, loss of the nose;
and for the third, death by hanging. The treatise attributed to Jacobus, whose authoriship
Domenico Maffei has challenged, appears in TRACTATUS UNIVERSI IURIS torn. ix (Lugduni 1549).
57. Pazzaglini, supra note 38, at 20-43, makes it clear that the ban could only have been
effective if appeal were not normally available to the contumacious defendant.
58. Id
59. Bowsky, The Medieval Commune and Internal Violence- Police Power and Public Safety
in Siena, 1287-1355, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 1-17 (1967); W. BOWSKY, A MEDIEVAL ITALIAN COMMUNE: SIENA UNDER THE NINE, 1287-1355, at 117-58 (1981), outlines the history of Siena's experiments in criminal jurisdictions and police functions.
60. BARTOLUS, CIVILE, supra note 20, ad DIG. JUST. 48.3.6:
Quero quis sit effectus denunciationis? Et videtur quod denunciatio habeatur pro plena
probatione. Creditur enim nuncio, et creditur officiali in officio . . . . Breviter ista est veritas: quedam sunt maleficia gravia, et in istis denunciatoribus non creditur . . . (et) quedam
sunt maleficia non gravia, et hic adverte quandoque punitur denunciator ad denunciandum
illud quod re ipsa invenit et vere illud quod vidit ipse. Exemplum: Mittitur aliquis ad perscrutandum per civitatem ludentes vel portantes armas et similia levia, et in istis creditur tali
officiali.
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Popular pressure extended beyond political support for "law and
order" legislation. Judges, who enjoyed a wide discretionary power in
conducting criminal investigations, sometimes had to use their arbitrium to protect suspects against popular bloodlust. No less an authority than Bartolus, who patently disdained Albertus Gandinus's
enthusiasm for torture, nevertheless felt constrained to put suspects to
the question before releasing them:
There are some stupid judges who force a defendant to confess (by
torture) as soon as they have bits of evidence (indicia)against him.
Certainly they ought not to do this because they condemn him on
the basis of indicia and suspicions. But they ought to apply tortures with moderation, and from these to investigate the truth. I
myself have done this frequently, but if the truth (of the charge)
was not established by torture, I absolved him, and I had it entered
in the records that "Having tortured him with moderation, I found
him not guilty." And this so that at syndication it might not be
said, "You should have tortured him.""
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, one can reasonably conclude that the idea of public interest lay at the heart of the new criminal
law of the High Middle Ages. Clearly, the phrase "rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita" carried a broadly suggestive
meaning after 1200. This meaning in the course of time, influenced
criminal procedure, the rights and roles of the participants, the law of
evidence and proof, the aims of penal institutions, and ultimately the
conception of crime itself. Indeed, one may say that the ideas associated with this maxim dominated the development of western criminal
law in its formative stages.
IV.

REEXAMINING THE ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN

CRIMINAL LAW

Nevertheless, the story of the phrase "rei publicae interest, ne
crimina remaneant impunita" is not complete. As suggested above, if
Innocent III had followed the standard model for resurrecting important ideas from Roman law, he must have dug this particular gem out
of some dusty corner of the Digest and presented it alone, shorn of its
obscure and obscuring context.62 If Innocent did this, he must have
rescued this maxim from the deepest and darkest of obscure sources; no
amount of scholarship, medieval or modern, has yet unearthed a passage in Roman law which reads quite like "publice utilitatis intersit, ne
61. Id at ad DIG. JUST. 48.18.20 s.v. Quisine.
Ideo dico hic quod sunt quidam iudices stulti qui statim cum habeant indicia contra reum
cogunt eum ad confitendum. Certe hoc non debet fieri, quia condemnarent eum ex indiciis et
suspitionibus, sed debent adhibere tormenta cum moderamine, et ex istis veritatem investigare. Et ita iam feci pluries fieri, sed si habita tortura non inveniebatur verum, absolvebam
eum, et hoc faciebam scribi in actis: "Habita tortura cum moderamine non reperi eum
culpabilem." Et hoc ne tempore syndicatus possit dici, "Tu debuisti eum torquere."
62. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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crimina remaneant impunita." The medieval jurists certainly did not
neglect the roots of Innocent's statement, for they indulged themselves
as a matter of professional pride and pleasure in the scholastic habit of
citing every possible legal source which might serve as an authority in
support of their positions. Invariably, when a medieval jurist argued
for public interest in some aspect of a criminal matter, as in arguing for
coercing witnesses to testify, the jurist cited Innocent's decretal Ut
fame. Beyond Innocent's own legislation, however, the chain of authority got sticky. Johannes Teutonicus, commenting upon this section
of Utfame, offered three passages from Roman law which purportedly
said the same thing as Innocent's decretal.6 3 Hostiensis, characteristically, unearthed five.' Bartolus, unlike many jurists, did not pile up
such citations; in support of this phrase, Bartolus presented only two
references to Roman law, one of which the other jurists had overlooked.65 Still, despite the erudition of the jurists, none found the
source from which Innocent had drawn his seemingly commonplace
principle.
Innocent had in fact borrowed the phrase from an anonymous
contemporary, rather than lifting a passage from the Corpus iuris civilis.
Although Innocent III's statement first launched the phrase into general circulation, he was not the first person to combine the ideas of
crime, punishment, and public interest. During the 1190's, a French
canonist had written that "It is proper and in the public interest that
crimes should not remain unpunished."6 6 The author of this passage
generally provided supporting citations when quoting from Roman
law, but in this case he offered none. Significantly, in the context of the
same discussion the canonist referred to Johannes Bassianus, and elsewhere the author relied upon Placentinus. In the absence of further
evidence, one may well speculate that a twelfth-century Romanist was
the source of this phrase, which was to have such a fruitful career.
Innocent's contribution, then, was not in the originality of his thought,
or even in any substantial improvement in the turn of phrase, which the
earlier canonist had enunciated in properly Justinianic tones. The outstanding contribution of Innocent III is that once his decretal gave the
63. J. TEUTONICuS, APPARATUS AD COMPILATIONEM TERTIAM 5.21.8, supra note 14, citing
CODE JUST. 9.47.14; DIG. JUST. 46.1.70.5; and DIG. JUST. 5.1.18.
64. HOSTIENSIS, supra note 15, ad X 5.39.35 s.v. elpublice citing DIG. JUST. 9.2.51.1; DIG.
JUST. 46.3.95.1; DIG. JUST. 5.1.18.1; DIG. JUST. 46.1.70.5; and CODE JUST. 9.47.14.
65. BARTOLUS, CODICIS, supra note 20, ad CODE JUST. 2.4.18 citing DIG. JUST. 9.2.51 and
DIG. JUST. 39.4.9.5.
66. The original phrase was: "crimina non remanere impunita publice interest et oportet."
Summa Induent sancti ad C.4 q. 1. My edition of this text appears in the MONUMENTA IURIS
CANONICI (ser. A) (1984) (Corpus Glossatorum). The author of Induent sanctimight have picked up
the phrase from Placentinus, who used the idea in his SUMMA CODICIS ad CODE JUST. 3.35:
"Huius legis actione etiam de occiso tenentur omnes qui percusserunt, ubi non apparet quis occiderit. Licet enim non ornes occiderint, tenebuntur, ne dicatur de occiso teneri aut nullum, et sic
maleficium remaneat impunitum."
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maxim wide exposure, the refrain "ne crimina remaneant impunita"
became a universal fixture in the legal vocabulary.
The virtually universal use of Innocent's statement most emphatically does not reflect a striking new breakthrough in legal concepts.
Rather, the use reflects the social, intellectual; and legal context of
western European society in the later Middle Ages. The Justinian Digest and the Justinian Code already contained both the language and
the ideas expressed in the maxim. In one imperial decree preserved in
the Code, Diocletian and Valentinian had ordered that imperial judges
not remit criminal penalties because it was in the public interest "ne ad
maleficia temere quisquam prosiliat."6' 7 Valentinian, Theodosius II,
and Arcadius had demanded that local officials put an end to the exercise of patronage that let crimes go unpunished.6 8 The Digest, as well,
contained passages suggesting a public interest in punishing all criminal behavior. A snippet of Gaius interjected that a magna ratio demanded that the courts punish wrongful actions.6 9 One Digest passage
quoted Paulus as writing that "it is neither good nor equitable to condenn an individual who accuses a miscreant, for it is right and expeditious that the sins of wrongdoers should be known." 7 Another Digest
passage lifted an argument for the deterrent value of public punishment from Tryphonius. 7 t Medieval jurists later cited all of these texts
as authorities for the statement "rei publice interest, ne crimina
remaneant impunita." The scholastic lawyers also unearthed several
texts in the Digest which clearly provided the textual bases for parts of
the medieval maxim.
Innocent III might have been quoting directly from Piperius Justus
when writing "si publice utilitatis intersit;" the same phrase appears, in
the indicative voice, in a passage of the Digest dealing with private donations to municipalities. 72 Two passages in the Digest mentioned
malefcia impunita. The first, drawn from Ulpian, states that a son, although not legally independent (sui iuris), might prosecute noxal actions if his father were far away, "so that malfcia [will] not remain
unpunished while the father is gone."'7 3 The second such passage concerns the case where an assailant has attacked and mortally wounded
someone and then another assailant attacks and slays the same victim.
This case posed the question whether the courts could charge both as67. CODE JUST. 9.47.14.
68. CODE JUST. 1.55.6: The crucial phrase is "qui non sinant crimina impunita coalescere."
69. DIG. JUST. 46.1.70.5: "Nam poenas ob maleficia solvi magna ratio suadet."
70. DIG. JUST. 47.10.18: "Eum qui nocentium infamavit, non esse bonum ob eam rem condemnari; peccata enim nocentium nota esse et oportere et expedire." The verbs here suggest that
this was the source of the phrase in Induent sanct,
71. DIG. JUST. 16.3.31: "Nam male meritus publice, ut exemplum aliis ad deterrenda
maleficia sit, etiam egestate laborare debet."
72. DIG. JUST. 50.12.13: "Conditiones donationibus appositas que in rempublicam fiunt, ita
demun ratas esse, si utilitatis publicae interest."
73.

DIG. JUST. 5.1.18.1.
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sailants for homicide under the lex Aquilia. Julianus argued the affirmative, despite the anomaly of the suggestion that the assailants had
twice murdered the victim.7 4 Julianus's rationale was that "it is not
fitting that crimes should be unpunished, nor should they be able to be
committed easily."" Finally, Julianus argued that jurists, on account
of the common utility, included in the law76 a great many things contrary
to the principles of disputatory rhetoric.
Despite the presence of such ideas in Roman law, public interest
never emerged as the unifying theme of the criminal law in the ancient
world. Perhaps the failure of this doctrine extended as far back as republican times, when the Roman jurists had ignored criminal jurisprudence while creating the foundations for an elaborate science in the
field of civil law. The scope of criminal law gradually expanded after
the fall of the Republic, as the emperors empowered provincial governors to prosecute crimina extraordinaria,so-called in contrast to the
crimina ordinariaalready established by republican statutes.7 7 The jurists of the imperial era nevertheless failed to create any consistent rationale for the expanded criminal law. The Digest continued to
distinguish between a broad category of wrongs actionable only by private initiative and the narrow class of crimina actionable by any citizen. 7 1 Platitudes touting public interest in punishing every sin, injury,
crime, and delict remained simply parenthetical observations in the
corpus of the law, while the imperial authorities' actual prosecution of
crime bore little resemblance to the traditional law preserved in the
Digest. As Fritz Schulz concluded, imperial criminal procedure "was
so undefined, arbitrary, and authoritarian, that any juristic construction
of concepts and principles would have been devoid of practical
significance.""
V.

THE CHURCH AND CRIMINAL LAW

As the western Roman Empire tottered toward dissolution, the
leaders of the Latin Church busily assimilated much of the Roman law
and made it the law of the Church. But while the Church leaders borrowed the vocabulary and the forms of Roman criminal law, they also
74.

DIG. JUST. 9.2.51.

75. Id
76. Id:
Quod si quis absurde a nobis haec constitui putaverit, cogitet longe absurdius constitui neutrum lege Aquilia teneri, aut alterum potius, cum neque impunita maleficia esse oporteat, nec
facile constitui possit, uter potius lege teneatur. Multa autem iure civili contra rationem
disputandi pro utilitate communi recepta esse, innumerabilibus rebus probari potest.
This passage was certainly the source of Placentinus' comments, cited supranote 66, in his SUMMA
at CODE JUST. 3.35.

77. See A.H.M.
90-118 (1972).

JONES, THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND PRINCIPATE

78. A. BERGER, ENCLYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 418, 430 & 573 (1953) (s.v.
crimen, delictum, and malefcium).
79. F. SCHULZ, A HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 140 (1946).
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rejected the penal theory which underlay the system. While the Christian leaders hardly approved of wrong-doing, they had ample reason to
reject the Roman approach to crime. The martyrs, almost by definition, cast a vote for some alternative to Roman justice. Furthermore,
the miracles of the early saints abound in tales of fetters broken, prisons unlocked, and admitted transgressors miraculously acquitted.
When St. Stephen's biographer narrated the story of the saint's successful intervention on behalf of one Florentius, an embezzler of public
monies, the moral of the story was not an endorsement of illicit selfenrichment. Rather, the tale was an exemplary contrast between the
benevolent patronage of the saint and the malign undertakings of the
Roman magistrates.8" The excessive measure of public retribution
under the Roman Empire discredited the idea that public interest demanded vindicta for every transgression. The Church leaders thought it
best to leave vengeance to God; the Church could better concern itself
with a penitential approach to wrong-doing, that aspired to rehabilitative and curative ends. Retribution was contrary to the spirit of the
New Testament. Other than protecting itself against heresy, the City of
God cheerfully left criminal matters to the City of Man."'
Although the Latin Church rejected the Roman definition of the
purposes of criminal proceedings, the Church leaders did preserve the
forms of Roman accusatorial procedure. In the real world, after all,
even the Church leaders could not follow literally Christ's injunction to
love one's enemies, or St. Paul's command to provide food and drink to
one's enemy in need.82 Augustine borrowed the Roman idea of due
process to formulate the classic statement of the rule that a court could
not pronounce a definitive sentence against a defendant unless the defendant confessed or the court legitimately convicted the defendant.8 3
Gregory the Great might have felt that truly good Christians would not
have exercised the right to prosecute any wrongs which they might suffer, but in 603, Gregory instructed his legate John to ensure that the
Spanish churches made use of the Roman form of judicial process
(ordo iudicii) in criminal cases.8 4 By the ninth century Pope Nicholas I
waged a not always successful battle against the erosion of the proper
Roman accusatorial process in ecclesiastical courts.8 5
This rejection of theory and preservation of forms is less of an
80. MIPACULI SANCTI STEPHANI 2.5.852, cited by P. BROWN, CULT OF THE SAINTS 102
(1981).
81. Augustine, De civ. Dei xix.17 pointed out that the earthly city seeks the end of civic
obedience and rule, the basis of an earthly peace. The heavenly city "makes use of this peace only
because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away."
82. Matthew 3:39; Romans 12:20.
83. Augustine, Sermo 351, no. 10 in the Maurist edition, excerpted by Gratian at C.2 q. I c. 1:
"Nos in quemquam sententiam ferre non possumus, nisi aut convictum aut sponte confessum."
84. Jaffe, no. 1530, quoted by Gratian at C.2 q.l c.7.
85. NICHOLAS I, EPISTOLAE 99 (E. Perels ed. 1925) (MGH, Epistolarum tom. vi) (the letter to
the Bulgars). Gratian quoted Nicholas on legal procedure at C.2 q.l c.10 and C.15 q.8 c.5.
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anomaly than one might first surmise. The Roman accusatorial process, preserved by the Western Church, embraced a stringent law of
proof and a strict requirement of due process,8 6 making successful prosecution of criminal cases extremely difficult. This procedural form protected the clergy from any but the most solidly grounded charges of
criminal misbehavior. Predisposed to prefer toleration over active
prosecution, and sensitized to the dangers inherent in scandal, the prelates of the Western Church contented themselves with punishing only
outrageous misbehavior that the Church could not ignore. Otherwise
the phrase "the Church does not judge secrets" expressed the Church
hierarchy's attitude toward crime.8 7
The Church's toleration is the principal reason that Innocent III's
new maxim "rei publice interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita" met
with a mixed response among his contemporaries. Innocent IV still favored toleration and a studied lack of interest as the proper ecclesiastical attitude toward crime. The concern that investigation of crime
would lead to scandal led Innocent IV to shy away from any broad
applications of Innocent III's "new" idea. In the thirteenth century,
however, the tide was running against Innocent IV's traditional ideas.
In the context of the ongoing reform of the Church, 8 which since the
eleventh century had featured an active campaign against simony and
clerical cohabitation, Innocent III's public interest doctrine made more
sense than Innocent IV's traditional reluctance to prosecute. Moreover,
with the enormous popularity of Aristotle, all of the jurists, and many
of the public officials charged with combatting crime, came to the study
of crime already grounded in the doctrines of social utility and public
interest. In secular society, the doctrine of public interest helped to
justify the nontraditional punitive measures which communal governments enacted to ensure stability and curb violence in the new citystates.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While one cannot venture to write the entire history of medieval
European criminal law by tracing the career of a single legal maxim,
the history of the phrase "rei publice interest, ne crimina remaneant
impunita" does cast some significant light upon the development of the
new criminal law of the High Middle Ages. The notion of public interest helped both explain and inspire such developments as the growth of
inquisitorial procedure, the elaboration of a new law of circumstantial
86.

Sufficiency of process is the subject of Causa 2 of the Decretum.

87. "Ecclesia de occultis non iudicat." S. Kuttner, Ecclesia de occultlis non iudicat."
Problemata ex doctrinapoenalidecretistarum el decretalistaruma Gratianousque ad Gregoriumix, 3
ACTUS CONGRESSUS IURIDICI INTERNATIONALIS 225-46 (1936).
88. For a general treatment of the legal impact of the Gregorian Reform, see H. BERMAN,
LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 85-119 (1983).
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evidence, the expanded use of torture in criminal investigations, and
the gradual abandonment of private initiative in criminal prosecutions.
Ultimately, offense against the public interest became the defining
characteristic of crime. The facts that the maxim was of medieval manufacture, that Innocent III launched the principle into wide circulation,
and that the civilian jurists borrowed the principle from the canonists
suggest that the legal revival of criminal law in the High Middle Ages
involved more than a rebirth of Roman law. Without discarding the
traditional view that the scholastic jurists rationalized medieval law
with principles drawn from Roman law, one can conclude that medieval jurists and public authorities were quite capable of fashioning new
ideas in order to justify new social relationships, new judicial forms,
and new functions for criminal law. If, as some historians have suggested, a theory of public interest is one of the essential features of
western European ideas about crime, then in the field of criminal law,
the modern world owes more to the scholastic lawyers of the High Middle Ages than to the Roman jurists of classical antiquity.

